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In order to full appreciate the Heidelberg proposal, I believe it is important to read it
not only as a reaction to the developments of the last year and a half in Hungary, but
as a response to a deeper problem of the European Union, of which the Hungarian
case is only a grave symptom. From the EU perspective what makes the Hungarian
case worthy of reflection is the lack of compelling force in the reactions of the EU to
national developments which clearly appeared to go against fundamental principles
of constitutionalism, rule of law and the protection of human rights. While before
and during the first half of 2011 (i.e. before and during the Hungarian presidency of
the Council) the EU’s reluctance might be attributed to mainly political reasons, the
overall tiptoeing reflects deep seated problems and tensions within the Union’s own
architecture.
The shorthand description of the source of these problems is what many refer to as
'the gap between accession conditionality and membership requirements'.
As Christoph Hillion explains (in Craig / De Burca: The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd ed.
2011) with the latest cycles of enlargement a thick layer of requirements generated
by various actors in such European networks as the Council of Europe and its
Venice Commission, or the OSCE and its human rights directorate (ODHIR) were
layered onto the EU’s own 'Copenhagen criteria'. Outside the framework of the
accession process, however, these conditions become difficult, if not impossible, to
impose on member states partly because of the lack of available procedures. The
suspension of membership as foreseen in Article 7 of TEU is certainly a means of
last resort, while post-accession monitoring of certain matters (as used in the case
of Romania or Bulgaria) is clearly not available as a measure towards other, older
members. The other part of the explanation for the lack of EU engagement stems
from the fact that many layers in the thick coating of the Copenhagen criteria are
best associated with some 'common European heritage' on certain matters, and not
with well defined Union competences.
To make any attempt proposing a solution to practical conflicts stemming from
'the gap' needs to also respond to – at least indirectly – to the seemingly age-old
dilemma concerning the extent to which the EU should be entitled to compel its
member states in maintaining the qualities of their democracies and the protection
they offer to fundamental rights under their national constitutions. After the rejection
of an ambitious proposal in the 1950’s to this particular problem which favored
a less supranational approach, famously it was the ECJ (often in cooperation
with the lower instance national courts) that came to remind members states of
some key membership obligations, despite the occasional resistance from national
constitutional courts. Therefore, it does not seem revolutionary that the Heidelberg
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proposal also views the judicial route as a means of triggering fundamental change
in the architecture of the Union.
As a side-note: One may certainly have second thoughts about the value of turning
to courts against a country where the government of the day has constitution making
majority and has already demonstrated its ability to withdraw a cardinal statute
affecting a fundamental right (freedom of religion) and then pass another one in less
than two weeks time. The current Hungarian political make up, however, is rather
unique, therefore it is important to address the proposed route beyond this rather
specific setting.
On its surface, the proposal is modest. After all, it does not require more than that
member states of the Union respect fundamental rights of citizens – a condition
which was imposed upon said member states upon their entry into the Union. It
is beyond the ambitions of my comment to explore whether the concept of Union
citizenship is the right vehicle to achieve this aim (taking into account Article
2 of TEU, Article 6 of TEU together with Article 51 of the Charter, and further 
developments in citizenship jurisprudence since Zambrano). The central claim about
the enforcement of fundamental rights across the Union, especially if the violation is
committed by a member state, may possibly be made and then operationalized with
developing several other principles contained in the Treaties. The same may stand
for such constitutional principles as democracy or numerous aspects of the rule of
law which are also mentioned in Article 2 of TEU.
In order to truly make a difference, the additional judicial remedy in the fundamental
rights context will need to be able to alter the currently existing, rather piecemeal
– and ultimately, so far, inefficient – approach the EU appears to undertake in the
face of large scale, systemic violations of its basic precepts. It is important to recall,
that the first compelling response of the Union to developments in Hungary was on
changes in media regulation. What is most worthy of attention in the present context
is that the EU response was based predominantly not on Article 11 of the Charter,
but on much narrower (and more technical) violations of the the EU audiovisual and
media services directive. Thus, it is at least arguable that while the Commission’s
intervention was instrumental in triggering an amendment to the media rules, the
EU intervention did not call for a major governmental reversal on media issues as a
whole. It is especially important to be mindful of the pressing need to offer a more
comprehensive response, because courts by their very nature have a tendency to
offer a pinpointed remedy in the actual case, and avoid addressing the underlying
systemic problems.
As a related challenge, one also has to account for the plethora of regional
institutions which may be involved in disciplining member states. The classic
example here would certainly be pointing out a potential clash between the ECtHR
and the CJEU. The bigger picture, however, includes a range of other institutions
in addition to the European courts, many of which – like the Venice Commission
– intervene upon the invitation of the member state affected and cannot impose
binding obligations in the opinions and recommendations. It will be interesting to see
whether the CJEU will be able to find a way to reflect on parallel developments from
the rest of Europe. After all, a wide range of EU accession (membership) criteria
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were inspired by the work of these non-EU and non-judicial fora on key constitutional
and fundamental rights issues. That would be a sign, against some odds, that
institutions do matter after all. Till then see Francis Fukuyama to the opposite effect.
Renata Uitz is professor of comparative constitutional law at Central European
University in Budapest.
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